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Habermasian Thinking on Civil Society and the Public Sphere in the Age of Globalization

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ABSTRACT

In today’s age of increasing globalization and the emergence of global public policy issues, the concepts of civil society, public sphere, and the legitimacy of the legal system require further analytical scrutiny and philosophical reflection. As such, this article reflects on how the renowned German philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas, in his Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996), addressed and reflected on the notions of civil society, the public sphere, and the legitimacy of the legal system. As Habermas admitted that barriers do exist within the civil society and the public sphere, the article examines the various ways of overcoming the barriers toward the full actualization of the civil society’s emancipatory potential. The article shows its conceptual arguments through the use of empirical examples vis-à-vis the arguments of Habermas, and most importantly, that Habermasian insights need to be cast at the transnational level of democratic politics, rather than within the strict confines of political processes within the nation-state.

Introduction

In the age of increasing global economic and political interdependence, the concept of civil society requires further scrutiny and philosophical reflection. As such, in this article, I reflect on how the renowned German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, in his Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996), understood the normative relevance of civil society, the public sphere, and the legitimacy of the legal system in the context of contemporary democracies. Considering that Habermas admitted that structural barriers do exist between the civil society and the public sphere, I examine the various ways of overcoming such barriers toward the full actualization of the civil society’s emancipatory potential. The article also shows its conceptual arguments through the use of empirical examples vis-à-vis the arguments of Habermas.

This article examines, first, the distinction between the Habermasian notions of civil society and the public sphere. Second, the article shows the various ways in which social movements can be empowered to reach the full emancipatory potential of the public sphere. Third, I discuss how the actions of the civil society, the public sphere, and the political state are structurally moderated by the legal system, and I introduce Habermasian ideas on the ethical considerations that the legal system must consider to promote emancipatory democracy.

The Habermasian Concept of Civil Society and the Public Sphere

Considered as one of the most influential thinkers in contemporary social and political theory, Jürgen Habermas, in his book Between Facts and Norms, reflects on some of the most important questions of contemporary legal theory and democratic theory. Namely, Habermas problematizes this important puzzle: whether the notion of a self-determining society of free and equal citizens can be considered as outdated by taking into account the intricacies and complexities of contemporary modern societies. Taking the The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere as the jump-off point, Habermas answers the aforementioned question in the affirmative and, definitely, Between Facts and Norms is an admirable philosophical treatise that theorizes extensively the relationship between law, legitimacy, and democracy. Particularly, Habermas, according to Yale political theorist Seyla Benhabib, meditates on the ways and reasons by which we give grounds for the legitimacy of the legal system. Accordingly, Benhabib summarizes the Habermasian argument, which asserts that “legality, or the system of law, is legitimate because the law is the most abstract medium through which conociates sharing a form of life can regulate one anothers’ communicative freedom.” In other words, such “communicative freedom” enables political actors to create, to deliberate, and to
justify the legal system in ways that make such agents as active creators and subjects of the law.

For Habermas, there is a fundamental difference between the public sphere and the civil society. Generally deemed to be much broader in scope than the notion of the civil society, the public sphere is defined as the “network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative and negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinion” and “reproduced through communicative action” that is ultimately based on a “general comprehensibility of everyday communicative practice.” The Habermasian concept of the public sphere refers to the intermediate area of institutions and practices that lie amid the private interests of daily life in the civil society and the domain of the highly politicized state apparatus. Indeed, the public sphere is completely distinct from the civil society, although the two are closely related and, in fact, conceptually dependent, because the former is a broad field of “private (non-governmental organizations)” in which individuals construct, deliberate, and amend various communally held understandings of the world and its meaning. Taking the notion of the Habermasian public sphere into account, one may contend that the public sphere serves as the intermediary between the family and the civil society, where a distinctive line of communication exists. Such demarcation between the family and the civil society functions to the extent that ideas are created, analyzed, deliberated, and amalgamated to form a thematically inspired public opinion. In the original definition of Habermas, the notion of “general comprehensibility” pertains to how the province of the public sphere is generally accessible, conceivable, and understandable, to the extent that openness and nonexclusivity are its distinguishing features—unlike the politicized state, where exclusiveness and elitism are often accentuated.

In addition, Habermas clarifies that the public sphere refers neither to the “functions” nor to the “contents” of daily and mundane communication; instead, it refers “to the social space generated in communicative action,” in which the communicative action, as noted by Baynes, denotes a specific type of “social action that is both based on and oriented to mutually supposed validity claims about shared interpretations of the world.” Notably, communicative action is completely antithetical to what Habermas calls as strategic action, which is merely fixated on influencing others, thereby implying the latter’s purely instrumentalist aims. Communicative action, it seems, refers instead to the collective pursuit of discovering, deliberating, and reflecting on the public good and the ways through such good can be enjoyed by the majority, if not all, the actors within the political community.

On the other hand, Habermas characterizes the classic notion of civil society (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft) as inclusive of “more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements” that are generally concerned about how “societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere.” As such, the civil society pertains to an open sphere of private organizations and groups, and it stands in contrast to both the immensely politicized state and the privately oriented market economy. What makes the civil society also distinct is its inherent function that allows citizens to construct various “public opinions” about their mutually shared collective interests. Notably, denoting the conceptual and operational interplay between civil society and the public sphere, Habermas concedes that the constitutional and legal systems, in their entirety, are not enough to safeguard the civil society and the public sphere from squalor. Thus, he suggested that the “communication structures of the public sphere must rather be kept intact by an energetic civil society.”

Conceptually, the public sphere, where social action is attained based on mutually shared interests, is invigorated and sustained by the concrete actions of an active and vigilant civil society (composed of actual private organizations that are primarily concerned of their conception of the public good), which allows its participants to engage in articulating, exposing, and resolving collective problems emerging in the public sphere.

Moreover, Habermas offers his insights about the supposed normative relationship between the civil society and the public sphere. First, a vigorous civil society can only flourish in the context of a “liberal political culture” and its conforming “patterns of socialization,” as well as in an atmosphere of “an already rationalized lifeworld.” One may interpret this as a situation, wherein there is a high tolerance for public discussion, deliberation, and collective reasoning, and, more importantly, the Enlightenment notion of free and equal citizenship is considered indispensable. Second, within the confines of the public sphere, actors can “only acquire influence, not political power.” For instance, the massive protests that were organized by national and local civil society groups within the United States during the early phase of President Bush’s campaign for the War on Iraq was not reasonably sufficient for the White House to abandon the war despite all these nationwide massive protests, because the civil society only has influence and not the political power. This implies that this “influence” of the civil society is somehow contingent upon the addressees of the actions mobilized by it, and whether such addressees are willing to be subjected to the influence being
asserted by the civil society. Third, considering such limitation, the civil society “can directly transform itself” and, at the maximum, can have an “indirect effect on the self-transformation of the political system.” Notwithstanding such apparently gloomy situation, Habermas still remains optimistic, when he asserted that the civil society has the chance of “mobilizing counter knowledge and drawing on the pertinent forms of expertise to make its own translations.” Such “counter knowledge” refers to its endogenous ability to produce alternative yet rationally created forms of understandings and interpretations in reference to the political state of affairs and its capacity as well to call on members of the epistemic community or the experts for “alternative understanding.” That so-called “counter knowledge” can be used by the civil society to inspire political actors to take collective action against the status quo.

Juxtaposing the Habermasian concept of civil society with the public sphere, Hegel’s notion of civil society is a bit simpler and market-oriented. Specifically, Hegel acknowledged the domain of market interactions and policing institutions, where an individual consciously pursues one’s interests, and, at the same time, incidentally benefitting public interests. On the other hand, Marx characterized the civil society in relation to the state, because both of them are deemed as instruments of the bourgeoisie or the dominant class. Taking into account the Hegelian and Marxists conceptions, the Habermasian notion of civil society is fundamentally different. Although Habermas acknowledges that private interests inherently exist within the civil society and how some elite push its interests over the collective society, he considers that the civil society, despite its limitations, can influence the state where political power ultimately resides. Notably, Habermas argues that the public sphere can only influence some actions of the political state, at the maximum, but cannot assert absolute power over the state, for civil society to directly push for changes in the political center.

Overcoming Barriers by Empowering Social Movements

Habermas poses an important problem about how political actors can advance issues on the public agenda and the determinants of the communication lines existent in the public sphere. Accordingly, mass media agencies cooperate with powerful and systematic “information producers” that usually advocate for the kind of information that represent their own interests. Habermas warns that “issues” are being molded, managed, and organized at the political center rather than from an instantaneous process commencing from the periphery. Nonetheless, the mass media, in which in “normal situations” are controlled by the political center (and the opposite in “crisis situations”), have the ability to overturn the political center, particularly in pushing for massive structural-societal changes leading to a revolution. For instance, one can refer to the work of Popkin, who edited well-researched papers that highlighted the fundamental and influential role of the press in key revolutionary movements and periods in early modern and modern European and American history. More specifically, Popkin accentuated how the media, as a network of communication systems, were crucial in the course of revolution from the seventeenth-century English revolution and to those revolutions that marked the end of “state socialism” in Eastern Europe, and more recently, in China.

Despite this apparently gloomy scenario, Habermas highlights that in normal situations, the civil society is often discarded, but in certain crisis situations, the civil social periphery can take up important roles whereby actors have the opportunity to transform the “normal” communication lines within the system and the public sphere. Consequently, such method can help in changing the entire system’s manner of macro-political problem solving. In such conceptualization, Habermas underlines the distinction between the civil social peripheries in contrast to the political center but still maintained that the communication lines of the public sphere are intricately associated with the private life spheres. To demonstrate this dynamic interplay between the center and the periphery, Habermas refers to the “great issues of the last decade,” such as poverty, women’s movement, immigration and poverty in the developing world, among many others. He contended that these issues were not raised within the political center where the state apparatus is located; instead, it was those from the civil social periphery (“intellectuals, concerned citizens, advocates etc.”) that reinvigorated the emergence of such issues advocated mainly by progressive social movements at that time. It was through an influentially provocative presentation in the mass media of such issues that originated in the periphery that made those unrecognized issues as part of the “public agenda” later on. In addition, with the sustained persistence of “sensational actions, mass protests and incessant campaigning” of issues originating from the social fringes, power configurations can be changed once the view on important social problems incite a realization of a crisis. In a liberal public sphere, the unofficial public communication undermines the possibility when brainwashed masses are manipulated by populist leaders—particularly by consolidating the “scattered components” of the public to have a strengthened political influence over the political center.
In addition, when the media acquires stronger influence for advocating adversarial arguments, such collective political behavior can be deemed as an “act of civil disobedience.”

Civil disobedience, in this context, refers to the articulations of oppositional stance against “binding decisions” that are often considered illegitimate in view of the constitutional principles. However, one has to consider that acts of civil disobedience always have two “simultaneous addressees.” First, such act is directed to those who hold political office as well as legislative representative authority to revive political debate on an existing legal or political rule in the face of persistent public criticism through civil disobedience. Second, on a more abstract level, quoting from Harvard philosopher John Rawls, Habermas averts that it is also directed “to the sense of justice of the majority of the community.” The Habermasian postulation of the second addressee reflects how the philosopher is indeed influenced by the Enlightenment thinking where universal normative values are deemed to be of utmost importance even in the political pessimism that is quite prevalent in highly capitalist and industrialized societies.

On the question of how acts of civil disobedience can be justified, Habermas contends that one must take into account a view of the constitution as an unfinished project. This actually refers to how the constitution—a fundamental body of rules wherein all other more specific laws, decrees and statutes are based on—must be dynamic enough to reflect the demands and the changing realities in the society. For instance, the Civil Rights movement in the United States (from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s) was aimed at eradicating public and private forms of discrimination against blacks or colored people and other marginalized groups and at making the legal system more attuned to promoting racial equality. With overwhelming developments that occurred as attributable to the success of the Civil Rights Movement, such as the ascendancy of African Americans into the high echelons of American society or even in White House such as President Barack Obama, one has to remember that the movement started from the peripheral margins of the society such that it consequently was able to challenge social and political norms that did not recognize the apparent macro-social “language-game” of political equality. The rhetoric of the movement was definitively addressed to the political system and challenged the constitutional body of laws that uphold the fundamental rules of the citizenry and the society and, more importantly, dramatically invoked the ideals of universal justice that promotes racial equality. Thus, social movements can be successful in challenging social and legal norms to the extent that laws have been introduced to overturn such “outdated” norms, thereby demonstrating the inevitable temporality and historicity of the constitution as an “ongoing project” for the society. Although not explicit in Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms, one may note that conceptualizing the constitution as such implies the continued vigilance of all sectors of the society to constantly rethink, reassess, and question whether the constitution is still relevant to the demands of a rapidly changing and dynamic nature of today’s societies.

The Legal System and the Complexity of the Modern Society

In the last part of the subsection titled “Civil Society, Public Opinion and Communicative Power” in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas examines the conceptual relationship between the legal system or the rule of law vis-à-vis the complexities of the contemporary modern society. Emphasizing first that the constitution indicates the “performative character” of the notion of “free and equal citizens,” he affirmed the contingency of the constitution as a product of its historical genesis, which means that the fundamental system of legal rules should always be construed as a derivative of macro-political struggles and achievements of the past. Little elucidated the concept of history by referring to the notions of human agency, change, and the function of material conditions in human affairs and the supposed meaning of historical happenings. On that regard, Habermas, to a certain extent, was influenced by Hegel’s concept of the dialectic, particularly on how the former tried to postulate the historicity of the constitution or the legal system. To elaborate on this, the Hegelian dialectic is an ontological view where the social and political worlds continuously emerge through a contradiction and a resolution of the contradiction. Thus, all given phenomena and components of today’s reality can be interpreted as a progression of contradiction and the resolution of contradiction. Likewise, a present-day constitution or the fundamental system of rules and norms—as well as the temporally conditioned interpretations of it—in any given democratic society can be viewed as a historical and time-bounded macro-political product, a document that functions as the derivative of contradictions and propositions that are then resolved (and synthesized) through the open space of the public sphere, where social agents (who are also historical beings) are primarily involved.

Furthermore, Habermas offers four substantive points that explain the idea of a historically grounded understanding of the constitution. First, the political system, a complex body governed by constitutionally based rules, is designed to produce “collectively binding decisions.” This refers to the idea that the political system
has powers and functions moderated by the fundamental rules set by the constitution, and its output—such as public policies and decisions—should always refer to the collective interest, and thus, subject to public scrutiny. However, there seems to be an “invisible divide” between the private and the public, and sometimes, the political state (which is ontologically public in nature) is caught up in the midst of whether taking truly transformative actions in the sphere of the private is crossing over such divide. Indeed, the post-9/11 security environment paved the way for heated public policy controversies on whether the emergence of the “national security state” invaded the privacy of many citizens in the name of national security, and this issue clearly shows the tension between the unclear and highly disputed boundaries of public–private domains.

Second, the political system is exposed to constraints set by two factors, namely, its nature as a “functionally specified action system” and as a “constitutionally regulated action system.” Denoting a very instrumentalist point of view, the first notion signifies the normative expectation placed over the political system in which it must be able to operate based on performative and distributive functions, more particularly in the provision of public goods to its constituents. Thus, this denotes the nature of the political system as somehow normatively predisposed to subject its functions based on the public good. To be sure, the bureaucracy, considered to be a component of the political state, performs several functions that aim to provide public service and many other modes of action that ought to serve the interests of its supposed constituents. The second notion, however, signifies how the political system is subjected to its internal institutional limitations, because its actions toward the external sphere are always limited and enabled by the constitutional provisions to which the political system owes its existence. In other words, the performative and distributive actions of the political state ought to be moderated by the mutually negotiated notions of “the public good” as determined both by the state itself and its targeted constituents.

Third, the tensions between the two natures of the political system (functional specification vs. constitutional regulation) are construed by Habermas to have an impact to the effectiveness and legitimacy of its decisions—or what Habermas calls as “steering problems.” To demonstrate such tension, the 2009 majority vote in Switzerland on the constitutional prohibition on the construction of Islamic minarets reveals a very interesting case of how the state addresses problems of its supposed constitutional duties vis-à-vis its abilities to respond to external macro-political demands. In this case, the Swiss People’s Party, the dominant party in parliament in 2009 and supported by members of the civil society groups, strongly advocated various reasons and political justifications that are supportive of a constitutional ban. Considering that more than 57 percent of voters and 22 of 26 cantons or Swiss administrative regions supported such ban, thereby indicating how a large chunk of the public sphere apparently appreciates the virtue of such policy, there was a substantial portion of the public sphere who expected that the ban would then be overturned by the Swiss Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. This particular issue in Switzerland definitely presents a complex myriad of issues addressed by Habermas, such as on how the constitution must be considered as an “unfinished project” and ultimately how the public is normatively involved in the continuous reconstruction and rethinking of such a “project.” Moreover, the “steering problems,” as Habermas calls them, may also involve the complex and multilayered issues pertaining to immigration and cultural integration of Muslims and other ethnic minorities in Switzerland, whereby the supposed electoral success of the ban indicates the potential success of the policy initiative of cultural integration (referring to the Habermasian idea of “effectiveness”). Yet the ban poses a problem of “legitimacy” because it had then been challenged in the Swiss and European supreme judicial bodies, taking into account how such ban apparently violates the freedom of religion of these minority populations in Switzerland. Supposedly, such situation is also insightful, particularly, when one considers that Habermas discussed the possibility when the “political system fails as a guardian of social integration if its decisions, even though effective, can no longer be traced back to legitimate law.” As such, the ban on minarets in Switzerland may be “effective” in the sense that it was apparently supported by the majority of the Swiss voters, yet such a decision posed doubts about its “legitimacy,” especially when one invokes human rights values, including the freedom of religion. More importantly, “steering problems” become more complicated when the power existent within the political state continues to be unchecked by the presence of a vigilant civil society and an active public sphere.

Fourth, Habermas suggests that citizens must be aware of how political systems are “asymmetrically embedded in highly complex circulation processes” because this may denote how the system is lopsidedly entrenched into a multifaceted cobweb of power relations within the wide expanse of the societal sphere. The call for citizens is to have a critical political consciousness for them to imbibe the “practice of self-determination” as “free and equal citizens.” This notion of self-determination means that citizens must be proactive in
knowing not only how the present-day political system works but also the nature of historical struggles in which the aforesaid system was made possible. Henceforth, it is only through a historically based knowledge and appreciation of the political system and the system of rights in which political participation becomes possible that we may better understand that our own rights are always cast against the changing dynamics of social conditions, and consequently, with the legal paradigms that support the interpretation of any given right in question. Habermas, in this case, may be pertaining to the apparent responsibility of the citizenry to be “educated” on their rights, and more broadly, on their supposed normative position in the political system. Aside from the proactive role on the part of the citizens, the political state (and perhaps with the civil social periphery) may also initiate a kind of a strengthened citizenship education that would inform the population of their rights, responsibilities, and their ideal legal and political relationship to the state. As such, Cogen and Derricott, using examples and case studies from Europe, North America, and Asia, maintained that, with the increasingly challenging social and political problems of the twenty-first century, political systems must reinforce “citizenship education” that is appreciative of the possible means and modes of responses that the citizenry may take. On that regard, Thornhill emphasized the Habermasian idea about the importance of the “social-integrative” process of the “self-determination of citizens,” which basically refers to how social integration is made possible when citizens fully internalize their rights and responsibilities. Thus, citizenship does not only pertain to the constitutional guarantee of political freedoms but it also entails the citizens’ self-realization of the legitimate ways on how such rights and responsibilities are ethically exercised in the macro-social sphere.

Concluding Remarks: Habermasian Ideas and Globalization

In the age of globalization, the power and significance of the nation-state seems to be diminishing. In many developing countries, a big chunk of the population is trapped in myriad familial and personal problems of health, job, and emotional insecurities, which, to a certain extent, are often blamed against the deficiencies of the nation-state or the political center. However, the problems of rising unemployment both in the North and South, political violence and terrorism, financial crisis, national debt servicing in the Third World, racism, poverty, and climate change reveal how the national political state seems to be structurally incapable of effectively addressing such overwhelming policy dilemmas in a highly globalized world. More often than not, most of these policy issues can be schematized through a complex web of causality that can even be traced beyond the confines of the nation-state.

Nonetheless, the apparent geographical limitation of Habermas’s stark emphasis on the legitimacy of the political decision making based on the strong presence of a civil society and a vigilant public sphere seems to fall short of the burgeoning realities of an increasingly globalized world, where many critically influential political and economic decisions are being made beyond the nation-state (e.g., EU, IMF, World Bank, and UN). Nevertheless, Habermas’s emphasis on the importance of the civil society and the public sphere in influencing the political center must be reinterpreted in light of increasing global political and economic interdependence, where the civil society and the public sphere apparently expanded at the transnational level—particularly, with the rapid growth of transnational civil society groups, global social movements, and the dramatic worldwide development in information and communications technology. Despite the apparent marginalization of the global society in Habermas’s discussion of the public sphere, the idea of the “constitution as an unfinished project” as a benchmark for legitimizing acts of civil disobedience seems to be very promising and analytically useful. This is the case when one takes a closer look at the key challenges of contemporary global politics, such as the struggles of civil social peripheries (within and beyond those states) in defying their respective nonliberal democratic regimes, such as in China, Syria, and other authoritarian countries in the developing world. With this in mind, the Habermasian ideas about civil society and the public sphere are still pertinent and will continue to be more useful in examining global and national issues that highlight the classic themes of center-periphery struggles, legitimacy of decision making, and the ways in which effective citizenship can empower a just and responsible state.

Notes


6. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 360.


11. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 367.

12. Ibid., 369.

13. Ibid., 371–73.


15. Ibid., 372.

16. Ibid., 372.


21. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 381.

22. Ibid., 381.

23. Ibid., 382–84.

24. Ibid., 383.


29. Ibid., 385–87.

30. Ibid., 386.


32. Cultural integration in this case may refer to Christian-oriented European culture that is dominant in Switzerland as opposed to the Islamic cultural overtones being promoted by the Muslim immigrants.

33. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 386.

34. Ibid., 386.


37. Interestingly, at the most extreme form, globalization is deemed to end at its apex in a phenomenon called “globality” wherein a supposed homogenized worldwide reality exists. See Sirkin et al. (2008).


39. In Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds. Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order (London: Polity Press, 1995), the concept of “cosmopolitan democracy” was introduced in which the authors explored the possibilities of extending democratic decision making beyond national border by institutionalizing extra-state institutions to carry out such objectives aside from the active involvement of relevant stakeholders of any given problem. The concept still presupposes the existence of nation-states vis-à-vis cosmopolitan institutions at the global level that aims to promote broader civic participation and reconfiguration of political power at regional and global levels.