American Hegemony and the Rise of Emerging Powers: Cooperation or Conflict
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Book Description
Over the last decade, the United States' position as the world's most powerful state has appeared increasingly unstable. The US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, non-traditional security threats, global economic instability, the apparent spread of authoritarianism and illiberal politics, together with the rise of emerging powers from the Global South have led many to predict the end of western dominance on the global stage. American Hegemony and the Rise of Emerging Powers brings together scholars from international relations, economics, history, sociology and area studies in order to debate the future of US leadership in the international system. The book provides a multidisciplinary space for critical analysis of the past, present, and future of US hegemony in various key regions of the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Middle East, Europe, and Africa — while also examining the dynamic interactions of US hegemony with other established, rising, and reemerging powers such as Russia, China, Japan, India, Turkey, South Africa.

The book explores how changes in the patterns of cooperation and conflict amongst states, regional actors, and transnational non-state actors have affected the rise of emerging global powers and the suggested decline of US leadership.

Academics, researchers, students, and policy practitioners who are interested in the future of the US-led international system, the rise of emerging powers from the Global South, and related global policy challenges will find this multidisciplinary volume an invaluable guide to the shifting position of American hegemony.

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Debating American Hegemony: Global Cooperation and Conflict

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&
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*Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or present are certain to miss the future.*

John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) Thirty-fifth President of the USA

*The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action*


*As an old Chinese saying goes, peaches and plums do not talk, yet a path is formed beneath them. These worthy fruits of cooperation across the Pacific Ocean speaks eloquently to the vitality and potential of China-U.S. relations.*

- Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, September 22, 2015

[https://www.ncuscr.org/content/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech](https://www.ncuscr.org/content/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech)

For the last several decades, economic globalization, sometimes referred to as neoliberalism (Fraser 1993; Harvey 2005; Regilme 2014; Sandbrook 2000), has been the dominant historical process shaping the contours of global capitalism. Its tenants have included a commitment to free trade and open markets, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the liberalization of capital markets, among other major features. This wave of global economic integration was, in many respects, led by the United States (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2015). Neoliberal orthodoxy itself emerged from American institutions such as the University of Chicago and it was anchored in organizations located in the United States, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which promoted and, in some cases, imposed these policies across the globe (Waltz 2000; Kirshner 2008). Economic globalization and the spread of US power including cultural hegemony appeared to move together (De Grazia 2009), as neoliberalism became a way for the US to sustain its position as global hegemon.

Yet in recent years the situation has changed (Overbeek and van Apeldoorn 2012). While those powers which were the historical victors of the original rise of capitalism and modernity, particularly North American and Western European countries, struggled to achieve high economic growth rates, rising powers across the world began to transform the shape of global order (Wolf 2014; Shambaugh and Xiao 2012; Kahler 2013; Terhalle 2011; Regilme 2013). China’s Gross Domestic Product growth rate reached upwards to ten percent, and India’s was not far behind. Russia began to pick up the pieces of the collapsed Soviet Union and assert itself as a major political player, driven by the production and export of energy resources. Countries including Brazil grew driven by a boom in commodity prices as, more generally, a ‘pink tide’ explicitly critical of US foreign policy took root in countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela. South Africa came together as part of the BRICS, as these countries gave birth to a new development bank. Turkey has moved to attempt to make itself a regional leader in shifting relations of conflict and
cooperation with American leaders. And China has built political roads of cooperation and infrastructure stretching to Central Asia through the “One Belt, One Road Initiative.” Most recently, the election of President Donald Trump in the US, in an attempt to ‘make America great again’, has created the potential to reverse decades of economic globalization as the US may shift away from neoliberalism inwards, driven by an exclusivist and xenophobic political agenda.

This list of changes is, of course, not exhaustive, but symbolic of a global power shift the world is going through: perhaps the most significant rearranging of international power since the rise of the west in the age of European colonialism and empire-building, in which Europe initially overtook China to become the world’s dominant political-economic center of power. This movement has created great uncertainties about the future of global capitalism. If neoliberal globalization and American hegemony have been the glue linking together countries across the international order with the effect of limiting the impact of great power rivalries (although not limiting US-led interventions across the world, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq or, more recently, Syria), what happens if the US opts out of liberal internationalism? And as the relative economic growth rates of the US and European countries stagnate—signified by Britain’s Brexit as an attempt to find economic growth separately from EU consensus—while those of China and other emerging powers continue to greatly outpace them, even if slower than in the last decade or two, at what point will ‘the rest’ surpass ‘the west’? Will western countries react through coercion, force, or violence to sustain their position at the top of the global hierarchy? Will cooperation amongst rising powers usher in a multipolar world? Will China use its economic might to assert itself as a global leader in the wake of American decline? What do these contemporary discourses on US decline mean to traditional middle powers such as Germany and the future of the European integration project?

In a sense, only time will tell. But if these changes are not analyzed, and potential sources of international conflict not realized, then appropriate political and policy strategies to manage the risk of global conflict in a quickly changing world might not be able to catch up with the erosion of cooperation and rise of tensions. World War III may not be on the horizon, but a growing wave of increasingly authoritarian leaders have come to power across the globe suggesting that the tendency towards international conflict may be increasing. Yet this shift may not necessarily lead to the outbreak of great power conflict as in previous ages. In response to Trump’s election, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a speech at the Davos World Economic Forum calling for sustained vigilance towards continuing economic globalization. As he put it:

We should commit ourselves to growing an open global economy to share opportunities and interests through opening-up and achieve win-win outcomes. One should not just retreat to the harbor when encountering a storm, for this will never get us to the other shore of the ocean. We must redouble efforts to develop global connectivity to enable all countries to achieve inter-connected growth and share prosperity. We must remain committed to developing global free trade and investment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation through opening-up and say no to protectionism. Pursuing protectionism is like locking oneself in a dark room. While wind and rain may be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air. No one will emerge as a winner in a trade war (Jinping 2017).
Soon after this, it was reported that Zhang Jun, director-general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry international economics department, suggested that China does not want to take a position as global leader, but "If China is required to play that leadership role, then China will assume its responsibilities" (Jun 2017). China’s transition to capitalism, which has led to it becoming the world’s second largest economy, came through engagement with the US and inclusion into the World Trade Organization. While today the US pushes back against neoliberalism towards Trumpism, China continues to promote the continuation of globalization and international economic integration, including supporting the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which Trump has removed the US. Thus while the US initiated and anchored neoliberalism, it appears, in the long run, China’s rise to the top may be its ultimate outcome.

The goal of this volume is to address these global issues under the theme of cooperation and conflict. Drawing from a diverse range of disciplinary affiliations in the historical and social sciences, the authors included in the volume each address specific aspects of the possibilities of future conflict and cooperation using both differing regional focuses and theoretical and conceptual approaches. In this sense, the goal of this book is not to close off debate or locate an ultimate solution or conclusion, but to create a space for authors with differing conceptual approaches and empirical expertise to express their positions as a way for readers to compare, contrast, and synthesize with the overarching aim of understanding the complexities of the global power shift in the making.

The puzzle around which this book is based arose through the difficulties we had of making sense of the fact that experts in a wide variety of disciplines and regional focuses seem to come to differing, and at times, opposite conclusions as to the current trajectory of global power. If it is the case that scholars come to differing conclusions due to the use of various theoretical perspectives or geographical emphasis, then might there be a way to solve this quandary? Our overarching perspective suggests that the unresolved nature of our questions may be due to the partial lenses through which social scientists are addressing the issues at stake. What is needed, we suggest, is a holistic, global perspective. First, on a conceptual level, we need an approach that compressively connects social processes operating in economic, political, and social realms. Thus particular perspectives that focus on American economic decline, or continued military strength, may view the question of potential decline differently, thus what is necessary is a complete analysis that can bring all these factors together. Secondly, on a geographical scale, there is a tendency for scholars who are specialists in particular regions to generalize based upon events in their area. But it may be the case that while American power is in relative decline in one location, it may not be elsewhere. Thus we need a global analysis that can link together all of the world’s regions to account for American power as a whole.

In other words, it is our contention in this volume that a rethinking of the terms of the debate may be necessary. But this new perspective can only be constructed on piece at a time, by examining the usefulness and limits of theoretical perspectives or academic disciplines one at a time, and foraging through the details of national or regional data individually before linking together the global picture. Differently put, this means continually bringing in new layers of analysis and levels of abstraction to work towards a comprehensive and inclusive world-scale perspective.
Main Puzzle: Cooperation or Conflict?

The prevalent optimism right after the Cold War in the 1990s motivated policy commentators and scholars to assert that “history has ended” (Fukuyama 1992). The dissolution of the Soviet Union and America’s unparalleled military prowess and extensive diplomatic influence cemented the widespread perception of a US-centric world order especially in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, the 9/11 terror attacks and the “war on terror” demonstrated the limits of American power, and what some scholars call as a signal of “imperial overstretch” (Cox 2003; Pieterse 2004). At the same time, the financial crisis in the late 2007-2008 financial crisis highlighted the fundamental vulnerabilities of the global financial system, particularly centered in Europe and the United States — an outcome that runs contrary to the growing economic clout of emerging powers, particularly China. The increasingly assertive economic diplomacy and strategic military interventions of China in the Asia-Pacific region, as clearly demonstrated in the establishment of artificial islands in the South China Sea maritime area, validates the growing perception that America’s hegemonic leadership is under siege. The election of Donald Trump and emergence of far-right and illiberal political movements within and beyond the West, and the bleak future of European integration all signal widespread perceptions of uncertainty on the future of Western-led global governance.

Viewing those developments, we ask several relevant but all intriguing questions that constitute our puzzle on US hegemony. The first part of the puzzle pertains to the ontological status of the world order as well as the epistemological issues concerning how to know the shifting transformations in international politics (Hurrell 2007; Katzenstein 2012; Narlikar 2013): Is the American-led world order currently in fundamental decline? If so, how and under what set of conditions and benchmarks demonstrate American decline? Is world power diffusing into an era without a hegemom? To what extent are we shifting away from a US-centric world order to a multipolar global system? What sorts of perspectives and empirical evidence are best used to make sense of transformations in the international system?

Most importantly, the second part of the puzzle on US decline refers to the implications of the transformations within and beyond those states as rising powers as well as the US as a status quo power (Hameiri and Jones 2015; Mearsheimer 2010; Acharya 2014; Nye 2015; Cox 2002; Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse 2008; Viola 2011; Craig and Murphy 2013): Do the shifting transformations in American power and its changing influence in the international system undermine the supposedly liberal democratic and market capitalism that the West has vehemently defended in the past decades? If so, how could these “Western values”, which underpin the current world order, survive, particularly amidst the rise of a challenger power such as China, the threat of a disintegrating European Union, and the emergence of authoritarian populist regimes in many places within and beyond the West? What are the implications of this shift for the possibilities of cooperation and conflict in the international system?

The aforementioned questions constitute the bigger puzzle of whether the American-led world order is in decline vis-à-vis the rise of new or reemerging powers in the international system. While the authors of individual chapters in this volume may not directly answer all those questions, each individual chapter offers theoretically informed yet empirically grounded arguments and insights on whether US hegemony is in decline and the conditions that led to such situation.
Analytical Goals and Multidisciplinary Strategy

We examine our puzzle about the purported decline of the US as the world’s most powerful state from a variety of theoretical perspectives and empirical examination drawn from a wide range of geographical coverage. We provide a rigorous survey of the most important factors that determine the ability of world powers to remain at their position. It also reflects on the various perspectives that inform different concepts of power, conflict, as well as cooperation. It demonstrates how such theoretical exercise can provide a better understanding of the debate on US decline in the context of emerging and reemerging powers such as China, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Russia, and India. In terms of geographical coverage, the contributions also examine historical and contemporary patterns of assertions of American power in several strategically important areas of the world — the Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America — where emerging powers are perceived to be challenging Washington’s influence. The chapters seek to examine the contemporary changes in the patterns of cooperation and conflict amongst states, regional actors, and transnational non-state actors in the context of emerging global powers and the suggested decline of US leadership.

Many contemporary analysts adopt particular frameworks privileging certain factors (such as economic, military, or diplomatic power) above others, and different conclusions are developed based upon this. By providing a space to compare a variety of frameworks, this edited volume seeks to clarify these debates. Additionally, often times global generalizations are made from regional analysis. In contrast, by providing analysis of many world regions, this book takes a fully global perspective. This is reinforced in that we have scholars from several continents and disciplines, including political science, history, economics, area studies, and sociology, contributing to the volume. By expanding the diversity of disciplinary perspectives, our volume enriches the scholarly and policy debates that often amplify only the traditionally strong influences of realist and liberal internationalist perspectives (Aalto, Harle, and Moisio 2011; Aalto, Harle, and Moisio 2012; Yetiv 2011).

Perspectives on American Decline

Predictions of the end of US hegemony are nothing new. In the 1980s, for example, in the wake of Japan’s rise, a plethora of literature was produced predicting the potential end of US global leadership. Among other prominent scholars, Robert Keohane suggested we were moving into an era ‘after hegemony’, Robert Gilpin suggested we might be moving towards increased international economic competition, and Paul Kennedy popularized the concept of ‘imperial overstretch’ (Gilpin 1987; Kennedy 1987; Keohane 1984). Yet other scholars, including Susan Strange and Stephen Gill, were more skeptical (Gill 1990; Strange 1987). And in many ways the field of International Political Economy (IPE) itself emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a way to address the question of the possibility of hegemonic decline (Cohen 2008).

But by the 1990s, discussions of decline were replaced by debates over globalization and the information economy. Japan was too deeply incorporated into American power to present any challenge and the American economy seemed to revive under the information technology revolution. But by the early 2000s, this discourse began to change. As the US initiated the ‘War on Terror’ invading Afghanistan and Iraq, and as China rose to further diffuse the shape of global
power, once again the question of American decline was back on the table. The increased use of overt military force, it was argued, may have been to compensate for declining economic power and hegemonic leadership (Arrighi 2005; Wallerstein 2003). And the shelves of bookstores were filled with volumes with titles including, among many others: When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World, and The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (Fishman 2006; Jacques 2009; Pillsbury 2016).

To this day it is unclear, exactly, what sort of world we are living in and, for that matter, what direction it is going (Beeson 2009). First, some argue that we are moving into a Sino-centric world (Mingfu 2015; Rachman 2011; Subramanian 2011). China’s growth rates continue to rocket past those of western countries, even if they have slowed somewhat in recent years. And while the country struggles with export dependency, if Xi Jinping’s Davos speech is suggestive, China will continue to develop a middling, consumer class who can move China towards a more self-sustained growth path. Meanwhile China is playing a key role in the creation of a new international architecture challenging American global leadership, from the BRICS New Development Bank which is headquartered in Shanghai, to its investments building a “New Silk Road,” to providing loans to African countries without the requirements of the IMF and World Bank, and beyond. Overall, looking through one lens, it appears China may be neoliberal economic globalization’s greatest victor.

From another lens, though, China may not become a new world hegemon. For one, the Chinese state seems to lack a universal ideology equivalent to the US’s self-proclaimed ‘exceptionalism’ and right to intervene and control world affairs in the ostensible context of the greater good. But while the US economy struggles to gain ground, and the US ability to shape global politics declines, it may be that we are moving towards—or are already in—a multipolar world (Clegg 2009; Desai 2013; Hiro 2010; Sachs 2016). Latin American countries have asserted a new independence from two centuries of the Monroe Doctrine, while countries around the world including Russia, China, Iran, South Africa, Brazil, etc. develop new international connections circumventing US leadership. The US may still be the biggest kid on the block, but it its muscle has diminished and it is not a unique hegemonic leader, but a powerful country in a diffuse world order.

Yet some continue to argue for the centrality of US power to the contemporary world order (Bremmer 2015; Brown 2013; Hung 2017; Panitch and Gindin 2013; Starrs 2013; Parisot 2013). This perspective suggests that the American state is still the central manager of global capitalism as the American economy remains the most powerful, backed by Wall. St. and the continuing use of the US dollar as ‘world money’. China, this point of view suggests, is actually deeply incorporated into American power, thus lacks the ability to provide any alternative leadership. The US military remains by far the world’s most expensive and powerful. And the ideal of American soft power continues to entice cultures around the world towards the image of the American dream. So while the US may no longer be as relatively powerful as it was in the ashes of the Second World War, it is still number one and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.

Chapter Summary
The organizational structure of the book is divided into three main parts. The first part of the book deals with the analytical and theoretical perspectives and issues pertaining to American hegemony vis-à-vis emerging powers. Aside from this introductory chapter, the first part features the chapter from Jeff Bridoux, who examines how our knowledge on power in world politics is being produced, sustained, and undermined. Departing from traditional and canonical conceptions of power that highlight material capabilities over intended outcomes, Bridoux suggests that we need a more holistic notion of power in world politics, whereby concrete and quantifiable outcomes of power (“what power does”) and qualitative and intersubjective conceptions of power (“how and why power does what it does”) are seriously considered. The chapter highlights the analytic importance of “perceptions of power” in making sense of how various intersubjective conceptions of power are produced within the knowledge-power nexus, which in turn, would have meaningful and substantial implications for foreign policy formulation and implementation. In view of the looming uncertainty of the current role of the United States as a global actor, one of the most important implications of the chapter is that one way of understanding the future of American hegemony is to zoom into the new actors in American foreign policy establishment under the Trump administration. The chapter suggests that the future of US hegemony appears to be a rejection of globalism and multilateralism and a seeming embrace of Americanism and a crude version of unilateralism. Taking the chapter’s analytical approach on power perceptions into account, one could hypothesize that there is a dramatic transformation of achieving or sustaining US hegemony under Trump: whereas previous presidential administrations relatively relied more on global engagement and democratic values, it appears that current American power is now being enforced through nationalist rhetoric, amoral policy justifications, transaction-oriented bargaining. Whether such shift is effective at all in maintaining American leadership is open to debate, but Bridoux’ chapter surely highlights an important insight: intersubjective perceptions about American power do matter, perhaps even more so than what that material power could really achieve.

The second part, meanwhile, focuses on the challenges and opportunities brought in by the emergence of rising powers in the non-Western world to American hegemony, particularly in the area of the transnational and global political economy. In contrast to purely macroeconomic diagnostics and predictive analysis we often hear in the public discourse, our approach in this part of the volume reconsider the role of the transnational markets and territorially-bounded states as areas of debate, power contest, and security struggles. On that regard, the chapter from Michiel Foulon espouses a two-level neoclassical realist perspective, whereby a merged view of economic and security interests led to American reassertions of hegemonic power in the past-quarter century amidst challenges of relative decline. Particularly, the chapter historicizes that the United States disengaged from its European military security commitments in the early post-Cold War era, which in turn, coincided with a dramatic increase of the presence of US military personnel and infrastructure in East Asia in the start of the new millennium. That military restructuring paved the way for the increasing American economic interests in East Asia in the 2000s, as a carefully crafted response to American decline. Using a multi-level framework of analysis, Foulon argues that this strategic rebalancing of the US via American led-economic integration in East Asia (while excluding China) is a result of domestic economic interests and macro-global structural transformations. In other words, Foulon’s chapter maintains that the US is in decline, and the
domestic pressures and systemic factors of American decline endure even amidst the seemingly transformative Trump administration.

The chapter from Julian Gruin offers an innovative analysis of the future of post-American monetary order, particularly by zooming into recent developments in international financial centres (IFCs) as focal points of the global monetary system that still features state-led and market-oriented processes of transformation. Drawing upon insights from constructivist international political economy and financial geography, Gruin analyzes Hong Kong and London as two central offshore sites for RMB currency internationalization and their eventual role in the transition to a post-American global financial order. Although Gruin does not contend that transnational financial market actors in those financial capitals have already readily and decisively embraced Chinese financial and monetary governance, the chapter maintains that appreciating such transformations is crucial to understanding the future of the global monetary order, where discussions have often underappreciated the role of ideas and spatially embedded institutional change that Gruin used as analytic lens. More broadly, his approach also suggests that if we want to locate new global relations in which Chinese power is increasing, we may need to look for alternative variables besides those typically considered.

In contrast to the dominant view that American hegemony is in decline, Sean Starrs argues the opposite: we are now entering an era much closer to the American century than the US has so far ever achieved. The chapter from Starrs contends that China has long since renounced its anti-capitalist position, along with many countries in the Global South (even emerging powers), and have started renegotiating the conditions of integration in the global capitalist system. Despite the emerging international financial institutions established by emerging powers (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “BRICS Bank”), China and emerging powers frame those institutions as complementary frameworks to the already existing institutions built since the dawn of American hegemony. Starrs highlights that the current global political economy demonstrates a potentially continuing trend of “American-style mass consumerism” and the spread of American economic interests in a world capitalist economy that continues to integrate more and more countries from the Global South. Whereas the election of Donald Trump and the 2016 Brexit vote appears to have reinforced assumptions of American decline, Starrs’ chapter cautions that the US-style consumerist attitudes and the “anesthesia of the American dream” could hinder “working-class unity challenging capitalism”. Starrs challenges the view that the US is in fundamental decline, as the emergence of markets in the Global South and their continuing integration in the global capitalist economy indicates the “end of the beginning of the American century”. Finally, using data on global corporate power, Starrs attempts to demonstrate the extent to which American economic power remains number one. In short, for Starrs, American hegemony is alive and well, and its influence is continuing to grow.

The final part of the volume adopts a more comprehensive and global scale approach of examining the status and future of American hegemony vis-à-vis emerging powers and security struggles in various world regions, particularly in East Asia (on Japan, by Walden Bello and Giulio Pugliese), the Middle East (on Turkey, by Digdem Soyaltin and Didem Buhari Gulmez), South Asia (on India, by Carina van de Wetering), Africa (on South Africa by Obert Hodzi), Europe (on Russia, by Maxine David), and China’s influence in Latin America (Rhys Jenkins).
analytic motivation herein is to unravel the puzzle of US hegemony vis-à-vis emerging powers, particularly its meaning and implications to several world regions.

To begin this concluding part of the volume, Walden Bello provides an insightful examination of the Japanese government’s policy dilemmas under the Trump administration. Characterizing the shock to Tokyo’s policy establishment due to the political uncertainties posed by the Trump administration, Bello contends that Trump’s rise to power marks a radical shift: espousing “isolationism, unilateralism, and protectionism delivered in an insurgent populist style” — a paradigm that contravenes, as Bello claims, a given bipartisan that usually embraces the notion of America’s “global commitments”. In this chapter, Bello argues that, since the end of the Second World War, Japan has been a semi-sovereign state under American tutelage, a situation in which Tokyo’s interests and dilemmas in the Korean peninsula, in Beijing, Moscow, and Southeast Asia have effectively been shaped by Washington’s policy establishment. That historical given is now under threat in the Trump era, thereby marking a crisis in Japanese politics and precariousness in the future of US-Japan relations. Bello, however, concludes with a cautiously optimistic tone by underscoring that such crisis also presents an opportunity: “forging a more progressive foreign policy that moves away from being an extension of Washington’s security and foreign policy while at the same time avoiding a regressive nationalist response that could lead to the activation of the country’s nuclear capability”. Bello’s chapter highlights the dilemmas faced by less powerful states’ alliance relationships with hegemonic states, particularly when hegemons appear to move into its own isolationist cocoon, alliances are bound to be redrawn in ways that redefine how regional security could be achieved, but that could also mean the beginning to a process of regressing American hegemonic influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Similarly, the chapter of Giulio Pugliese examines the Japanese government’s China policy amidst US relative decline. Employing a structural realist approach, Pugliese’s chapter contends that US is in decline relative to China’s re-emergence as a key actor in world politics. In agreement with Foulon’s chapter that the past few years have witnessed an increasing regional economic integration in Asia-Pacific with China as a key mover, Pugliese argues that this phenomenon of American decline facilitated increased Chinese-US rivalry. That bilateral rivalry, however, did not spearhead an increased US militarization in the region. Pugliese, instead, observes that the Obama administration was “more hands off than many observers acknowledged”, which in turn, facilitated a quite unprecedented Japanese military assertiveness since the end of the Second World War. Building on rich empirical evidence and perceptive historical analysis, Pugliese’s chapter predicts that the increasing regional economic integration in East Asia will further test the American-centric liberal order, as demonstrated by the prevalence of autocratic measures by Beijing as a way to shore up its political legitimacy.

In addition, American power is also a key factor in Middle Eastern regional politics. On that regard, the chapter by Digdem Soyaltin and Didem Buhari is an excellent overview of the historical underpinnings and political dynamics of US-Turkey relations and an examination of Turkey as a rising power. Employing process tracing method, the chapter underscores three stages in US-Turkey relations: (1) strategic partnership that emerged during the Cold War; (2) “model partnership”, which emerged during the US-led ‘war on terror’ and features the key role of Turkey as a supposedly successful exemplary state in a conflict-ridden region; and, (3) “new foreign policy” stage, which demonstrates Turkey’s recently reinvigorated and assertive role in recent
years. The chapter reveals an insightful paradox in US-Turkey relations: an openly pro-US foreign policy stance of Turkey coincided with a decreased political influence in a predominantly skeptical Middle Eastern view on American hegemony; whereas the recent years of a very assertive Turkish foreign policy and further consolidation of domestic state power attracted some doubts whether Turkey is antithetical to broader American interests. Notably, the chapter challenges mainstream views on Turkish foreign policy. First, instead of characterizing Turkey as a “passive reactionary” actor in the region, the chapter maintains that its foreign policy strategy has always been anchored upon “pragmatism and a historical aim to influence her neighborhood based on Ottoman legacy, culture and socio-economic interdependence”. Second, whereas many view recently assertive Turkish government’s role in regional and international affairs as a pure outcome of domestic consolidation of state power, the chapter highlights the facilitating role of international systemic factors. Whether the US is in decline maybe beyond the explanatory power of the evidence provided in the chapter, yet Soyaltin and Buhari makes an important point that the rise of Turkey as a key regional player in the Middle East can actually reinforce American hegemony in the region — a view that is largely ignored in public and scholarly discussions of US-Turkey relations.

In South Asia, meanwhile, India is now being portrayed not only as key player in Asian politics but also a potentially powerful world actor. Applying discourse analysis, Carina van de Wetering’s chapter maintains that narratives of American decline have been recurrently juxtaposed with discourses of India as a rising power, a perspective that a “discourse coalition of politicians, the media, scholars, and think tank experts from 2001 until 2016” holds. Focusing on texts and policy-oriented outputs produced by the Brookings Institutions, one of the most influential foreign policy US think tanks, the chapter highlights how and to what extent India was painted as non-threatening emerging power. Considering the revolving door between policy agencies and think tanks in the US during that time, such characterization of India constrained the range of policy options that the US government implemented in dealing with its affairs in India. In other words, it appears that the US-India bilateral relationship from 2001 until 2016 was a story of cooperation. Van de Wetering, however, cautions, that the US government under Donald Trump’s presidency might bring new “discourse coalitions” relevant to US-India relations, and that coalition might have the potential to dramatically transform the story of bilateral cooperation between a seemingly declining US and a rising Indian state.

Dubbed as the “backyard” of the United States, the Latin American region has been experiencing increasing economic engagement with China, which is predominantly seen as a rising power and the prime challenger of American hegemony. Rhys Jenkins’ chapter empirically traces the transformative economic and political relations of China in Latin America and demonstrates that the increasing Chinese political interests in the continent has been primarily driven by commercial interests — a quite expected outcome considering that China is now the second biggest economic power in the world and a leading source of foreign investments. Jenkins warns, however that Beijing’s over-all significance for Latin America is marginal when compared to American power, a trend that is likely to be reinforced by geographical constraints. Insightfully, Jenkins underscores the idea that the Trump administration means that US-China-Latin American trilateral relations are at a “crossroads”: a highly protectionist US could undermine America’s economic and political ties with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, which in turn, could facilitate an opening for more possibilities of stronger influence and presence of Chinese interests in Latin America.
The chapter from Obert Hodzi focuses on South Africa as a regional actor in the African continent and its relationship with the US as an established power and China as a challenger power. Applying the concept of “self-other identity formation” in his empirical analysis, Hodzi characterizes South Africa as a rising power with various contentious and competing regional and international identities. Particularly, South Africa considers itself as a Western power — a state that is committed to liberal international norms including democracy, human rights, and humanitarian intervention, but at the same time, the country also wants to reinforce its “African identity” by imbibing the paradigms of “pan-African ideals of African Renaissance” and “African solutions for Africa’s problems”. The latter identity renounces Western interventionism and external influence in the domestic affairs of African states. The underlying assumption in Hodzi’s chapter is that the US is neither in decline nor in the rise. Instead, his chapter provides a more nuanced response by underscoring the increasing competition for influence in the African continent from new or reemerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil, yet South Africa’s advantage over those other emerging powers is its “Africaness”. The fundamental problem, however, is that it is still an open debate whether the rest of African states affirm the legitimacy of South Africa as an independent regional hegemon. Affirming that American hegemony in the African continent is at a crossroads, especially with the rise of Chinese influence and the political uncertainty brought by the Trump administration, Hodzi highlights that the South African state will most likely be caught enmeshed in this US-China struggle for regional hegemony. One way of moving forward for the South African state is to settle its “conflicted identities” to make its foreign policy decisions and alliances much more decisive.

The final chapter contribution is written by Maxine David, who considers Russia as a re-emerging power that strives to challenge US hegemony in various ways, more particularly in the political and military spheres. The chapter extensively discusses two long-term principal strategies employed by the Kremlin that aims to undermine a perceived unipolar world dominated by US hegemony. The first strategy refers to balancing, as demonstrated by Russia’s membership in several regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The second strategy, meanwhile, pertains to the delegitimization of US hegemony, using the case study of the global governance of the Internet. Maxine David warns that while Russia’s conditional successes in challenging US hegemony were done unilaterally, Russia-China bilateral relationship should be a cause for serious concern for US policy-makers and strategists. The chapter maintains that there is a considerable pattern of continuity in Russia’s relationship with the USA, particularly by highlighting how Moscow has persistently undermined American unipolarity, in a range of global governance issues and regional areas for contestation.

Each of these studies, in a wide variety of forms, speaks to the question of the potential decline of American power. Some argue the US is still number one and will continue to be so, others suggest the US has entered into a phase of decline, and still others are more concerned with raising theoretical and empirical questions which are yet to be addressed well enough to generalize about a global power shift in the first place. Taken as a whole, the points of view developed by bringing these contributions together, we hope, is something larger than each taken individually. In other words, in total, the contributions demonstrate the combination of empirical and conceptual rigor, in their own approaches, which may make solving the question of potential American decline and the future direction of global power possible.
We do not claim our volume fully completes this task. But what it does is to forge the path for a much more comprehensive analysis of American hegemony and the future of global cooperation and conflict. For readers, we have created a vast space of perspectives and evidence which begins to make it possible to start to conceptualize the question of American hegemony and rising powers on a global scale, in a way that links developments in economic, political, and social relations. In this, we hope, this book presents the reader with a comprehensive and eclectic view of American power and gives space to discover both insights and potential limits of a variety of prominent and emerging disciplinary and theoretical perspectives.

9

p.5: By the end of the decade the Chamber of Commerce and National Federation of Independent Business had doubled their membership, and corporate lobbyists in Washington multiplied over ten-fold; political action committees funded by capital far outdistanced those of labour, and hard-hitting new thinktanks—the American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute—were at battle stations -- Highlighted 12 Apr 2017

19

p.15: The bearing of colour, critical in delivering victory to Obama at the polls, has been minimal on his record in of ce. One out of ve male blacks has continued to know incarceration under his rule, without a word from the White House on their fate. The indices of black unemployment and poverty have not budged. The business of the Democratic Administration has lain elsewhere. Its rst concern was necessarily containment of the nancial crisis: the banks had been bailed out under Bush, but in the wake of the crash the economy was in free fall. -- Highlighted 12 Apr 2017

Albertus and Menaldo 2014

53

Why do autocrats adopt constitutions? This chapter argues that the fundamental reason is that constitutions can help dictators consolidate power, increase investment, and boost economic development – all while generating a steady flow of rents for themselves and their cronies without empowering challengers that might undermine their authority.

p.1: In arguing and demonstrating that constitutions under dictatorship matter, we draw on a strain of research that views constitutions as part of a package of institutions that foster self-enforcing stability in autocratic regimes (Albertus and Menaldo 2012a; Albertus and Menaldo 2012b; Barros 2002; Elkins et al. 2009; Elkins 2010; Menaldo 2012; Myerson 2008; Negretto 2013; Ordeshook 1992; Weingast 1997) -- Highlighted 12 Apr 2017

Davies 2014

central defining characteristic of all neoliberal critique [to be] its hostility to the ambiguity of political discourse, and a commitment to the explicitness and transparency of quantitative, economic indicators, of which the market price system is the model. Neoliberalism is the pursuit of the disenchantment of politics by economics. (p. 4, emphasis in original)

the elevation of market-based principles and techniques of evaluation to the level of state-endorsed norms. (p. 6)

References


Conclusion: The Future of Global Cooperation and Conflict

Salvador Santino F. Regilme Jr.
&
James Parisot

From the Americas to Russia, South Africa to Turkey, to Japan and China, and beyond, this book has presented a global picture of American hegemony and rising powers. The theoretical discussions included range from neo-realism to historical materialism to discursive analysis providing a space for readers to view the question of American decline through many lenses and make up their own minds based upon comparative analysis of a great range of approaches to the issue. Admittedly, we do not cover every region and country in the amount of detail that would entirely solve the questions at stake. Nor does this book detail and compare every theoretical school of thought which might be put to use to understand rising powers in contemporary global politics. To accomplish those tasks would take many volumes and hundreds of scholars. But what the book does provide is a multidisciplinary space that may be as much or more of a starting point rather than an end point towards moving to a global and comprehensive analytical frame making it possible to solve the question of the current and possible future movement of international power in the first place.

The theme this book was built around was that of cooperation and conflict. In other words, might the potential or relative decline of American power give way to new or increased forms of international conflict or war? Or is it possible that the United States may peacefully decline as China purports its own peaceful rise while other emerging and reemerging powers strive for regional hegemony?

The debate on American hegemony, as presented in this volume, provides us several key insights regarding global cooperation and conflict. First, perceptions about global collaboration and competition are socially constructed by powerful actors within the international system. Indeed, the notions of ‘status’ and ‘power’ are two important benchmarks that we often use to assess the over-all condition of a status quo hegemon and challenger powers. The chapters from Jeff Bridoux and Carina van de Wetering demonstrate that the power held by hegemons and rising or reemerging powers is constructed by the intersubjective and historically constituted perceptions, biases, and assessments of various coalitions of stakeholders in the international system. In other words, power is not entirely an objective reality, but an intersubjective and temporally constituted reality constructed within the international system — and that same principle also holds for global cooperation or conflict.

Additionally, the potential tendency of the US to withdraw from its global security and political commitments may create a cloud of political uncertainty amongst long-standing allies. Indeed, the underlying principle here is that the durability of the international system with US hegemony as its pillar can only be possible with the cooperation of a network of alliances, strategic partnerships, multilateral institutional frameworks. The possibility that the US might step away from actively maintaining that network, particularly after the election of President Trump, could have some transformative outcomes to existing patterns of global cooperation and conflict. That sense of structurally perpetuated uncertainty as a result of the hegemon’s eventual isolationism may lead to
redrawing or renegotiating current alliances, which in turn, could pose a serious threat to the durability of the post-Second World War international system. And the constant accumulation of trade and economic power relative to other states in the international system could engender inter-state insecurity, which in turn, could potentially trigger military conflict. The chapter from Michiel Foulon suggests that the economic insecurity experienced by the US led to military build-up in the Asia-Pacific region, which, if left unmanaged, could be a potential source of international conflict resulting from a status quo power struggling to maintain its hegemonic position. The chapters from Giulio Pugliese and Walden Bello show that uncertainty with regards to US security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region can lead to various sorts of unpredictable reactions from allies and challenger powers — and the cumulative effect of such destabilization of longstanding rules could eventually trigger interstate conflict in the region.

The chapters from Digdem Soyaltin, Didem Buhari, Maxine David, and Rhys Jenkins, meanwhile, add further global complexity to the issue. Soyaltin and Buhari underscore how US hegemony in Europe and the Middle East would be difficult to maintain without the enduring commitment of a regional player such as Turkey. The picture Jenkins presents is less one of great American decline, so much as a slight power shift in which the US remains highly influential in Latin American and this does not necessarily pose a source of conflict for the US, at least in the short term. And David highlights the increasingly important issue of US-Russia tensions bringing out the ways that Russia continues to press against American unipolarity at the same time engaging in relations of pragmatic cooperation but not subservience to other countries such as China.

In contrast to, for example, Foulon, Sean Starrs’ chapter argues that the current global capitalist system is still a US-centric system — and the rise of China as an economic powerhouse may not be seen as a key source of conflict if only for the reason that American hegemony is just beginning to consolidate its control over the global capitalist system, with China participating in its perpetuation. Julian Gruin’s chapter, meanwhile, demonstrates the ways in which China’s economic rise, in the realm of finance, may be peaceful as international financial hubs such as London remain open to RMB internationalization. One of the most notable insights from his contribution is that the global monetary system is an underappreciated policy area for empirical investigation for the challenges posed by rising powers such as China.

Drawing these perspectives together in a global and multi-layered perspective, then, it seems that many aspects of the cooperative relations American power has been based around for the last half century, in shifting forms, remain intact, at least to a degree. China’s rise does not necessarily mean conflict amongst great powers, but China may slowly continue to increase its global influence in ways that does not ultimately challenge or replace American hegemony, at least in the short run. And while the BRICS and other institutions have formed as spaces of cooperation between rising powers, these organizations themselves are not without conflict. In this case, it may be hard to imagine China, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, India, South Africa, and so on, from developing a shared common vision of an alternative to US leadership; and their desire to do so may also be highly limited, depending upon the case.

Yet conflict does exist. The Syrian refugee crisis, fueled by American-Russian tensions, among other factors, is considered the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II and does not seem likely to end in the immediate future. Countries such as the Philippines and Japan may continue to
increasingly assert themselves, in part reacting to China, thus fueling instability in East Asia. Latin American countries may continue to search for alternative trade and political partners to the US, given the US’s controversial record in regards to interventions and human rights on the continent (Robinson 1996; Sikkink 2004; Renouard 2015). The apparent rise of illiberal and authoritarian politics within and beyond the West (Boyle 2016), if it is any indication of the decline of US hegemony couched on a human rights and liberal democratic rhetoric, remains one of the key challenges in global politics. How can cooperation thrive at the international level if the norms and global governance institutions established under the sponsorship of US hegemony are now being questioned (Evans 1996; Regilme 2016)? How can interstate and global cooperation thrive when information and “truth” are now highly contested? What forms of conflicts could emerge when global governance institutions such as the United Nations, international justice, and human rights norms become seriously threatened? Will rising state powers, reemerging state powers, and other non-state actors that challenge or perpetuate US hegemony defend the global order that emerged after the Second World War — even amidst the increasingly dangerous polarization in American politics (Hare and Poole 2014)? What forms of global political economy and capitalism could emerge in case of an eventual American decline, and would a post-American global economy be non-imperial (Katzenstein 2005)? How and to what extent would conflict or cooperation emerge amidst a global order that is now highly contested as rising powers increase their influence (Stephen and Zürn 2014)?

And the way those aforementioned questions, conflicts, puzzles, and issues play out, among others—the extent to which they escalate—will likely depend upon the perceptions of power which motivate political action. Most of these developments are perceived to be transpiring at the global structural level, yet the future of global cooperation and conflict also depends on individual political agency — constrained or reinforced by the opportunity structures afforded by national, regional, and global institutions. If global and national structures are not effective in promoting relative peace and in promoting human dignity and sustainability, then perhaps other avenues of political action may need to be explored. When corridors of powers where global peace and conflict are regularly negotiated or contested are closed for rational and open deliberation, then perhaps the challenge for individuals is to overcome collective action problems and to take their demands for peace, justice, and dignity in the streets and to be prepared to govern effectively and justly the day after the protest.
References


